The Arab Spring in the MENA Region: it is not the economy! by Montalvo, José García
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African
Economies Quinlan School of Business
9-1-2012
The Arab Spring in the MENA Region: it is not the
economy!
José García Montalvo
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Quinlan School of Business at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact
ecommons@luc.edu.
© 2012 the authors
Recommended Citation
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies, electronic journal, Volume 14, Middle East Economic Association and
Loyola University Chicago, September, 2012, http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Vol. 14, September 2012 
 
1 
 
Opening  Remarks in  International Summer Conference of MEEA with Center For 
Research on the Economies of the Mediterranean  (CREMed),  European Institute of the 
Mediterranean, Barcelona. Spain  (June 23, 2011). 
 
The Arab Spring in the MENA Region: it is not the economy! 
 
José García Montalvo 
Academic Director, CREMed and Professor of Economics, 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
 
 
During the first weeks of the Arab Spring of 201, many analysts argued that the bad 
economic situation of the countries in the MENA region was enough to explain the 
popular rebellion. Spanish analysts were not an exception. Two articles in the best 
selling Spanish newspaper El Pais claim that it was the economy what explained the 
social uprising in the Arab countries.  
 
“It is the economy, again”!  However, even if we adopt a Spanishcentric view of the 
world,  it is very difficult to accept this explanation. Analysts and writers have 
emphasized heavily the high youth unemployment in the MENA economies. But, if the 
explanation is the high youth unemployment,  then how is it possible that we do not 
observe an even larger rebellion in Spain? The Spanish economy has an unemployment 
rate of 45.3% (young people below 25 years old). With the exception of Yemen, there is 
not any country in the countries of the uprising with such a high level of youth 
unemployment. It is true that the measure of unemployment is only an approximation in 
the countries of the MENA area because of large proportions of underemployment but 
there are also problems of measurement in Spain. In terms of general unemployment,  
the Spanish economy has also a higher level than the MENA with the exception of 
Yemen.  
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“It is the lack of education of young people” claim some others as the cause of the 
revolution. However, the countries of the region have spent more than 5% of GDP in 
education during many years. This percentage is clearly higher than the average 
developed country. The increase in the average years of education, corresponding to the 
investment in education, has been very large. Certainly, the quality of education is still 
questionable in many cases. But, in any case, the first stage when claiming the 
education ladder is improving the quantity. 
 
“It is the lack of growth”, some others claim. Wrong again. The countries of the region 
were growing faster than Spain and many of the developed countries. Other pundits 
claim that the origin of the revolt is the high level of inequality. But the Gini index of 
the countries in the MENA region is not so high. The Gini index of Egypt is very 
similar to the Spanish Gini. Most of the countries in the regions have Gini indices 
between .35 and .40. Countries with a high level of inequality reach Gini indices 
between 65 (South Africa) and 57 (Brazil). In addition, may empirical studies have 
shown no relationship between inequality, measured using the Gini index, and social 
conflict. 
 
The final explanation is poverty: the countries in the MENA region are poor and, 
therefore, they have a high probability of social conflict. In general, it is correct to claim 
that countries of the region are poorer than the average country in the developed world. 
For instance, and following with the Spanishcentric view, while the GDP per capita in 
PPP of Spain is around 29,000 dollars, the countries of the region reach levels well 
below that mark. Still, we should make two comments. First, Bahrain has been the focus 
of many demonstrations, up to the point of canceling the Formula 1 race. But, the GDP 
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per capita in PPP of Bahrain is clearly higher than the same magnitude in Spain. 
Secondly, recent research has cast doubts on the relationship between poverty and 
conflict. Traditionally, the empirical literature has claimed a connection between 
poverty and conflict (Collier and Hoefler, 2004). However, the most recent research 
finds no evidence of a causal relationship between poverty and conflict. Djankov and 
Reynal (2011) show that once institutions are included in the regressions,  the effect of 
poverty on the probability of conflict disappears. The reason is simple: if the regression 
includes only poverty and not the quality of institutions then there is an omitted 
variables bias. In particular, the quality of political institutions can have a simultaneous 
effect on poverty and the probability of conflict and, therefore, the relationship between 
poverty and conflict is not causal.  
 
The poor quality of institutions is another characteristic also shared by the countries of 
the MENA region. Measuring institutional quality is a quite challenging endeavor. 
However, researchers have dedicated many efforts to this task. The most commonly 
accepted measure of political institutional quality comes from the Polity IV project 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). One representative index (the so called Polity2) is 
constructed mixing measures on several subcomponents: how competitive and open is 
the recruitment of the chief executive; the method of election of the leader; institutional 
constrains on the executive (checks and balances); control of the military by the 
executive; and competitiveness of political participation. This index ranges from -10 
(worst) to 10 (best). Several researchers, for instance Reynal-Querol (2002) and Hegre 
et al. (2001), have found an inverted U shape in the relationship between the level of 
quality of political institutions and the likelihood of conflict. For low values of the 
index,  the level of repression is so high that the likelihood of conflict is very low. For 
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very democratic countries the probability of a conflict or a civil war is also low since 
citizen have the possibility of choosing their political representatives and those have 
limited powers, constrained by others independent institutions of the state. The highest 
likelihood of conflict and civil uprising is associated with average levels of institutional 
quality. In those regimes the level of repression is not high enough to deter 
concentrations and demonstrations. A look at Table 1 shows that this inverse U shape 
theory is quite applicable to the Arab Spring of 2011. Countries like Tunisia, Egypt or 
Yemen, with an intermediate to low level of political institutions quality, have had 
successful revolts with not many fatalities. By contrast, in countries with lower level of 
institutional quality than those three (Syria and Libya),  the revolt is being much more 
dramatic in terms of lost of human lives. Finally, in countries with a very low level of 
political quality (Saudi Arabia or Qatar) the Arab Spring is absent. Obviously, I am not 
claiming a deterministic relationship between conflict and the index of political quality. 
This is just another case study that gives support to the inverted U shape theory. 
 
Table 1. Polity2  Index 
Polity 2 index  
Tunisia -4 
Libya -7 
Yemen -2 
Bahrain -8 
Qatar -10 
Egypt -3 
Syria -7 
Lebanon 7 
Jordan -3 
Saudi Arabia -10 
Kuwait -7 
Morocco -6 
Algeria 2 
 
Therefore, we could summarize graphically the previous paragraphs: it is not the 
economy, stupid! It is the desire of democracy and good political institutions which 
explains the Arab Spring of 2011. The role of Internet (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) was 
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important in the revolts although it has been a bit overemphasized. It was more 
important as a window for citizens of the MENA region to look at life in democratic 
countries than to gather people for demonstrations. It was the desire of having a political 
regime “like them” that counted the most for the critical mass of demonstrators in the 
Arab Spring. But, we should be realistic: when and how a dictatorship ends is decided 
by the military. Therefore, demonstrations were a factor but the side taken by the 
military has been decisive in the resolution of each of the revolts. 
A final note of caution: the success of the political transition from dictatorship in Spain 
has led to Spanish politicians to go to Tunisia and other countries of the regions to 
“teach lessons” on how to perform a peaceful transition to democracy. However, the 
particular experience of Spain is not easily translated to other countries, and even less to 
Arab countries. We know of other experiences of traumatic imposition of democracy 
that have failed in the region with dramatic consequences. Healthy democracies are 
constructed with a bottom-up approach and not by imposition from top to bottom.   
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